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 STM'KMKHT OK NATURE OF CASE ''' • •'- ; .-• "' 
Respondents-ck- i<-n-.; i, *:pand upon the 
Statement •<! Hv- Nat an o: tn< OaL>e (;i~ appellant-plaint . i, 
together T - ; iragraphs xn ». s ;K IO: wni.cn, 
reasons hereafter o I i udcd to, +~he resp'..;-drji- rta are 
selective and misleading. The parties are hereafter referred 
to as in the lower coin l 
Plaintiff commenced this action in Fourth ,s' "'""•"" i 'I: 
Com: i in • md for Duchesne County when the defendants, v . th • 
the assistance of the Duchesne County ;.!hoi: 1 t. i: , requires u 
coun i-.-rder as a condition to permitting plaintiff to enter 
upon then: .land. ( \< ,188) Such an action was commenced and 
a temporary injunction, issued with n , together with 
an Order to Show Cause why a permanent injunction should not 
be entered, was set and heard before the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorensen on January 28, 1974, (R 17, .1 8 and UK)) Following Lhe 
hearing, the Court: noted that, since a bond or undertaking in 
the amount of $l>|f 000 had been posted and n check payable from 
the plaintiff to the defendants In. the amount of $3, SOD was 
on deposit w.ith the; clerk of the court, the restraining order 
would remain in effect. (\< 4t and lt>">) Specifically, in the 
said order or Memorandum Decision, the Court said, "AT I issues 
•I 
touching on damages are reserved for trial of the action on 
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its merits.11 (R 46) At the hearing before Judge Sorensen, 
it was admitted that the access road to the proposed well-
site had already been cut and fully installed by the plaintiff 
before defendants were ever heard in the matter. (R 128 and 
129) The well-site at the time of the hearing was still under 
construction. 
The following September, defendants made a motion 
for an injunction and restraining order supported with an affi-
davit (R 47-50) stating that plaintiff was constructing a natural 
gas pipeline across the surface of the subject property to the 
defendants' damage and outside the terms of its restraining 
order. While the motion for injunction was pending and before 
the day set for the hearing arrived, the gas pipeline was 
installed by the plaintiff as admitted by counsel for the 
plaintiff at the time of trial. (R 145) Accordingly, the 
motion was continued without date and counsel instructed to 
follow Rule 20. (R 52) Rather than submit the merits of the 
laying of the pipeline as a separate item under Rule 20, the 
defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim and reincorporated 
those issues and its affirmative defenses in their Answer and 
Counterclaim. (R 53-56) In the said Counterclaim, the 
defendants pled trespass, eminent domain, and further asked 
for damages for unreasonable and excessive use of the surface 
interest by the plaintiff. The matter proceeded to trial on 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
April 14, 1975, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock. It 
must be noted that the lease under which plaintiff was pro-
ceeding was attached to the original Complaint on file (R 4) 
and said copy attached to the Complaint is manifestly illegible. 
As noted from the transcript of the trial, (R 170-172) the 
Court at a preliminary pre-trial ordered plaintiff to furnish 
a legible copy of the lease to the court and counsel prior to 
the trial of the matter. Said copies were furnished on the 
morning of the trial of the matter. Accordingly, a fourth 
theory was advanced by the defendants at the trial and leave 
asked by the defendants to amend the pleadings to conform with 
that theory, to-wit, that the defendants were entitled to 
recover crop damages under the terms of the lease. Permission 
so to amend was granted by the Court at the conclusion of the 
trial, (R 350) and the Memorandum Decision of the Court and 
later the formal Findings and Conclusions granted relief to 
the defendants, both under the language of the lease for damage 
to growing crops and for the pleading of excessive and unreason-
able location of the road site, resulting to damage to 15 acres 
of irrigated pasture of defendants. (R 64-71) 
-3-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court found that the 5.88 acres occupied 
by the access road and the drilling site had growing crops 
within the meaning of paragraph 10 of the lease and that said 
road and well-site permanently and effectively denied defendants 
any use of the land, resulting in damages of $5,292. In addition 
the Court found that the plaintiff, in constructing the access 
road where it did, unreasonably interferred with the pre-
existing irrigation of the surface by defendants, although 
there were non-interferring and reasonable ways available to 
it which would have allowed defendants to continue their estab-
lished use of the surface; and the Court found that there were 
no reasonable alternative surface irrigation uses available 
to the defendants to continue to use said surface productively 
and determined that the resulting damage to the defendants was 
$11,250. The Court further awarded interest to run from the 
date of occupancy by the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL \ 
The decision of the lower court is amply supported 
and justified by the facts and is in accordance with the appli-
cable law and should accordingly be affirmed. 
4 
-4-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the plaintiff's Statement of Facts alludes 
exclusively to that testimony which supports its position on 
appeal and ignores the considerablef credible and probative 
evidence which the lower court considered and upon which its 
decision was based, the defendants respectfully call to the 
court's attention the following facts: 
Defendant, Anthon Rust, and his wife, Onaf were the 
surface owners of three 40-acre parcels of land situated in an 
L-shape in the northeast corner of Section 22, Township 1 South, 
Range 4 Westf Uintah Special Meridian, located in Duchesne 
County. (R 66) Exhibit 2 received in evidence was a warranty 
deed for the two 40-acre parcels adjoining each other along the 
east boundary line of said Section 22 and on which the well-site 
and across whiqh the access road complained of were built. 
Exhibit P-4, also received into evidence, shows that the well-
site was located in the southwest corner of the north 40 of the 
said 80 acres described in said warranty deed, and that the 
access road bisects the north and south 40's effectively as it 
runs east-west from the county road into the well-site. On at 
least three different occasions prior to the constrution of the 
well-site and the road, defendant, Anthon Rust, requested the 
agents of plaintiff not to bring the access road into the well-
site from the east, but rather to construct it running south 
-5-
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to the well-site from the county road along the north border 
of the subject property. (R 143-5, 147-51 and R 163) The most 
explicit testimony in that regard comes from Mr. Charles Rich, 
"heavy equipment manager" of plaintiff: (R182) 
"Q What was the discussion about the road? 
A I told him that probably it would come so they would 
have to put the location there. He said, "If you do come 
in, put the road in from the north." 
Q Did he say why? 
A So it wouldn't go through his hay field. 
Q Did he give any other reason? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Did he discuss irrigation at all? 
A I believe he did, yes, that it would break up the 
pattern of his irrigation. 
Q And that his irrigation pattern generally was north 
and south? 
A Yes. 
Q And that the whole 80 acres was covered by the same 
irrigation system, correct? 
A Not the whole 80 acres, as I recall, it, but his r 
whole hay field, the hay field was talking about was 
covered, 
Q And the pasture below that hay field was irrigated 
pasture, was it not? 
A Yes. Uh-huh. 
Q You can identify irrigated pasture when you see it? 
A Oh, yes. 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q And you were aware that water comes from the north? 
A Yes. North and south, 
Q And you are also aware that it tilts to the west? 
A Right 
Q And therefore if you put the road in from the north 
you'd be putting the road in where it wouldn't interfere 
with that irrigation pattern, is that also correct? 
A Yes." (R 228-230) 
Also from the testimony of Tom Wheatly, Jr., an independ-
ent contractor who acquired rights of way for plaintiff, is 
similar testimony: 
"Q It had not been determined, but don't recall Mr. 
Rust telling you that he wanted you to bring it in from 
the north? Do you remember discussing that at all with 
him? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q And his reason for that was that the irrigation pattern 
rather than*from north to south on that 80 acres, wasn't it? 
Do you remember that discussion? 
A Right. 
Q And if you ran a road across from the east you'd be 
interrupting that whole irrigation pattern for the lower 
40, the south 40, isn't that also correct? 
A Right." (R179-18Q) 
There is considerable additional testimony from Mr. Rust 
and from Marcellus Palmer, defendants' appraisal witness, that 
the irrigation pattern on the 80~acres in question was generally 
from north to south. (R 14 5-146) 
* Counsel for defendants assert the word "than" 
should have been transcribed "runs". 
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It was generally also agreed by all witnesses that in 
the 80 acres,there were approximately 15 acres of hay growing 
which had been planted by Mr. Rust, which 15 acres ran along 
the east county road and was situated both in the north and the 
south 40-acre parcels and that the balance of said 80 acres was 
in natural and planted range grasses. (R 267-268) Mr. Rust 
further testified that putting in the east-west road bisected 
his hayfield and cut off irrigation water to approximately 20 
acres of irrigated pasture in the south 40-acre plot. (R 256, 
283 and 285) This was corroborated by Mr. Palmer and both 
testified that the only way to get water to those 20^acres 
would be by some pumping system, which, Palmer testified, 
would be economically unfeasible. (R 283) Both Mr. Rust 
and Mr. Palmer testified that the subirrigation waters, or 
those waters that would flow below the surface of the land 
naturally from the north 40 to the south 40 acre parcels, were 
effectively cut off by the east-west road since the compacting 
of the same by the heavy oil rigs and trucks repeatedly coming 
across the road prevented the otherwise natural subsurface 
flow of water. (R 251-253, R 282 and R 284) 
Anthon Rust testified from the time of acquiring the < 
subject parcel, in addition to plowing and planting the 15 
acres of hay, that he seeded and reseeded every four years all 
of his pastures with grasses, alfalfa and clovers. (R 267-8) i 
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Exhibit P-4, prepared by plaintiff and to which most of the 
witnesses had reference, shows on its face a division between 
"hay meadow" and "pasture" and a dotted line saying "division 
of fields" showing that the "property damage area" constituting 
the well-site was located in the irrigated pasture portion of 
the north 40-acre piece. Mr. Palmer testified that the irri-
gated pastures contained "partially native and partially seeded 
species of grass and legumes." (R 276) As it relates to the 
well-site and the access road, both Mr. Rust and Mr. Palmer 
testified that the crops heretofore growing thereon were not 
only destroyed for the year in which the construction took 
place, but the ground had been so materially compacted and 
altered as to make the whole 5.88 acres unproductive permanently. 
(R 260,284 & 291) The plaintiff's own appraisal witness, Mr. 
Grant Gerber, stated that the irrigated pasture was "brome 
grass and orchard and alfalfa mainly...I mean tame grass is 
in it." (R 323) He also stated: 
"Q Did you take into account the fact that after the 
drill site or if the well should cease to produce this 
property would return to use by Mr. Rust, was there 
any calculations made? 
A No, I didn't. I just considered the property 
was gone forever." (R 331) 
And again: 
"A ...The ground that was taken out, I'd have to concur 
with Mr. Palmer that it just doesn't look like they could 
ever put it back the way that it was before, and, there-
fore, it was lost." (R 331 and 332) 
-9-
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M4 ( - Reference at this point should also be made to Exhibit 
D-6, which shows recorded on the backside thereof the pasture 
land north of the well-site indicating that in the rear, dirt 
had been mounded up to make, in effect, an earthen platform on 
which the well-site and tank battery are now located, which 
Palmer testified could not economically be made productive 
in the future. (R 284) Also as it relates to the productivity 
of the land still irrigated as opposed to that which is no 
longer able to be watered, see Exhibits D-6, D-8 and D-9. 
Plaintiff, both in its Statement of Fact and Argument, 
asserts that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that 
the plaintiff could have located the access road in some reason-
ably alternative location. In that connection, plaintiff over-
looks the testimony of its own witness who did, in fact, oversee 
and construct the actual road, Mr. Charles Rich, who testified 
in that connection as follows: * .- ^ 
11Q And if in fact you had run a road down the edge of 
his hay field on his higher ground, it would have still 
been able to connect at a well-site, wouldn't it? 
A Y e s . .- - •.:,••' 
Q It wouldn't have required nine thousand dollars 
worth of fill? 
A No. 
Q You didn't ever explore that possibility, did you? 
A No. I just — See, that wasn't my job." (R 236) 
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In the same series of questions, Mr. Rich testified that even 
if he had put the road in from the county road on the north 
down "the fence line" which abuts the west boundary in Exhibit 
P-4 along the section line adjacent to the "property damage 
area" , that the cost of the road would have been approximately 
$9,300. (R 235 and 236) Contrary to the assertions of plain-
tiff of the great expense and inconvenience in building a road 
in from the north, its own principal witness, Mr. Reese, 
admitted under cross-examination as follows: 
"Q And your primary consideration in locating the site 
where you did and the road where you did I believe you 
said was because it was the shortest distance, quote-
unquote, is that correct? 
A That is correct." (R 310) 
In short, therefore, his principal concern was not the expense 
of fill, but rather "the shortest distance." 
In its Brief, appellant repeatedly complains that the 
court below erred in trying the case as though the matter were 
an eminent domain proceeding. In that connection, two things 
should be noted: First, counsel for the plaintiff entered no 
objection at any time in the course of the trial to the valu-
ation testimony introduced by the defendants, either through 
Mr. Rust or Mr. Palmer. Second, the following comment by counsel 
at the outset of the trial is relevant: 
"MR. MC KEACHNIE: Your Honor, our preference 
would be for us to proceed briefly on our claim and allow 
the defendant to proceed as in a condemnation case. 
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THE COURT: All right. Any objection to that, 
Mr. Madsen? 
MR. MADSEN: As though it were a condemnation 
case, you say? 
MR. MC KEACHNIE: As if it were." (R 170) j 
Plaintiff's own appraisal witness, Mr. Grant Gerber, in 
large measure corroborated Mr. Palmer's theory of value, even 
though his numbers differed substantially. In the court 
below, defendants pointed out in their Brief to that court 
that Mr. Gerber's testimony was not credible for two reasons: 
First, he had only inspected the subject property after the 
improvements were put in (three days before the trial) and he 
had no first-hand knowledge of or about the irrigation patterns 
on the property prior to the location of the well-site or the 
building of the road. And further, Mr. Gerber represented in 
his original direct testimony that he was using the "market 
data" approach to value, (R 318) but then admitted on cross-
examination that he had, in fact, collected no comparable sales 
and used no market data. (R 335) Over the objection of the 
defendants, Mr. Gerber went on to attempt to pass judgment or 
impeach the comparable sales used by Mr. Palmer, which counsel 
for defendants maintain was error. But the Findings of Fact \ 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the lower court would 
seem to indicate that no great weight was placed on Mr. Gerberfs 
testimony by the trial court, and so the claim of error is ^ 
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not seriously urged here. 
The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the lower 
court were amply substantiated by the admitted testimony from 
both Mr. Rust and Mr. Palmer. Specifically, Mr. Rust testified 
that his damages to the 5.88 acres of crop land taken or made 
permanently unproductive was $11,760 and that the change of 
use from irrigated pasture to dry pasture for the 20-acre par-
cel on the lower 40-acre tract was $33,000. (R 261) Mr. 
Palmer's testimony regarding the 5.88 acres made permanently 
nonproductive was $8,204, (R 284) and that the damages occas-
sioned by the change of use of the 20-acre parcel from irrigated 
to dry pasture was $25,000. (R 286) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 5.8 8 
ACRES TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF FOR A WELL-SITE AND 
ROAD CONTAINED "GROWING CROPS" WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE OIL AND GAS 
LEASE. 
The oil and gas lease involved in this action, which 
was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-3, contains the fol-
lowing provision at paragraph 10 thereof: 
"10. LESSEE shall have the right to use, free of 
cost, gas, oil and water found on said land for its 
operations thereon except water from the wells of 
LESSOR. When required by LESSOR, LESSEE shall bury 
pipe lines below plow depth and shall pay for damages 
directly and immediately caused by its operations to 
growing crops theretofore planted on said land." 
By virtue thereof, the plaintiff assumed the burden of 
paying "damages" to growing crops. 
The testimony in this action was that the land taken 
by the defendants for the well-site and for the road was irri-
gated pasture land (some of the road was actually in hay), and 
the testimony further was that the defendants periodically 
seeded this area with various grasses for cattle grazing. 
(R 276 and 268) 
Does irrigated pasture consisting of, as the evidence 
shows, grasses, alfalfa and clovers (R 268) (grasses and legumes, 
as another witness put it)(R 276) cared for (R 343) and periodi-
cally seeded by the owner of the surface constitute a "growing 
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crop" within the meaning of the lease? We submit that the 
authorities answer this question in the affirmative. 
We refer the court to the following statement found in 
38 Am Jur 2d, Gas and Oil, Section 118, which states as follows: 
"The fact that certain plants are generally con-
sidered to be a part of the realty has been said 
to have little, if any, bearing on the question 
whether they fall within the purview of an oil and 
gas lease provision requiring the lessee to pay 
for damage casued by his operations to growing 
crops on the land. Cultivated pecan trees bearing 
nuts of good quality that are harvested by the 
owner have been held to be growing crops within 
the purview of such a provision. The same is 
true of King's Ranch bluestem grass, a perennial 
plant, lespedeza, an annual reseeding plant, and 
clovers, legumes and grasses that are seeded for 
either pasturage, meadow, or seed crop purposes." 
The case of Cities Service Gas Company v. Christian, 340 
Pac 2d 9 29, an Oklahoma case, decided in 19 59, presented a situ-
ation where the court was called upon to construe a pipeline 
lease which provided that: 
"Grantee shall also pay reasonable damages to 
growing crops, fences or improvements occasioned 
in laying, repairing or removing all lines, drips 
and valves...Grantee shall bury pipeline below 
plow depth." 
The court held at page 934-5 of the decision that the phrase 
"growing crops" should be "given a broad and not a narrow con-
struction", and the court held that the bluestem grass, rye and 
vech, and rye and wheat represented "growing crops" within the 
aforesaid language of the easement. The case appears to stand 
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for the proposition that no distinction can be made between 
annuals and perennials, as such, but that, rather, the meaning 
of the word "crop" depends on the facts of the particular case. 
The court further held in that case that certain native pecan 
trees which had been destroyed by the pipeline company were "a 
growing crop". Even though they were native trees, the court 
stated at page 936 of the decision: 
"Under the facts of this case, we are of the 
opinion that the native pecan trees in contro-
versy represented the growing crop or improve-
ment within the provisions of the easements..." 
The same court in a later case of Superior Oil Co. v. 
Griffin, 357 Pac 2d 987, 87 ALR 2d 224 (1960), held at page 991: 
"We are of the opinion that where clovers, legumes 
or grasses are seeded for either pasturage, meadow, 
or seed crop purposes, the resulting crop should be 
treated as a growing crop within the purview of the 
provisions of an oil and gas lease to the effect that 
damages will be paid for damage to or destruction of 
growing crops." 
The court further stated that the pecan trees involved 
in that action, although they may have originally been natural 
in their origin, had been, nevertheless, thinned by the plain-
tiff, and he had likewise pruned the trees, cleaned up dead 
leaves and otherwise taken care of the same to produce a pecan 
crop, and the court held that the pecan trees likewise came 
within the phrase "growing crops", and the court stated at 
page 991: 
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"In view of the effort and labor so expended, the 
pecan crop cannot be said to have resulted solely 
from the power of nature." 
In the case of Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abramsy 413 Pac 2d 
190 (Colo. 1966), the court held that "natural prairie grass" 
was a "growing crop" within the meaning of the oil lease pro-
vision requiring compensation for damage to growing crops. 
We think the lease provision is clear. If ambiguous, 
however, it should be noted that normally an instrument should 
be construed against the party who prepares the same. If the 
oil companies desire to limit the meaning of the words "growing 
crops" to that contended for the plaintiff, it is well within 
their ability to revise their lease agreements to clearly so 
provide. In the absence thereof, the said documents should be 
construed in favor of the land owner. 
It should be noted that the lease inures to the benefit 
of defendants as third party beneficiaries. In the aforesaid 
Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams case, it was held that where the 
mineral rights were severed from the surface, that the owner 
of the surface rights was entitled to the benefit of the pro-
visions of a lease entered into between the lessee oil company 
and the owner of the mineral estate, lessor, as a third party 
beneficiary. 
In the light of the authorities, plaintiff's contention 
that "growing crops" means annuals only is untenable. Further, 
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its apparent position that an oil company can proceed with 
total iinmunity in the winter since there is nothing growing, 
would permit the most outrageous conduct by oil companies; 
and it cannot be supposed that the parties intended such a 
result by the phrase ''growing crops". On the contrary, the 
finding of the lower court is in accord with basic notions 
of fair play and is fully supported by the law and by the 
facts. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER TEST IN 
DETERMINING DAMAGES TO GROWING CROPS WHERE 
THE CROP LAND HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY AND 
PERMANENTLY TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court used the correct measure of damages for 
destruction to growing crops. The cases which we have cited 
above in Point I, to-wit, the Cities Service Gas Co. case and 
the Superior Oil Co. case, have announced a rule which we 
think applicable in the instant case. In Cities Service Gas 
Co., supra, the court held at page 9 37 that the rule for meas-
uring damages is as follows: 
"The rule for measuring damages arising from injury 
or loss of trees is the value of the premises upon 
which the trees grew immediately prior to the 
destruction and the value immediately thereafter." 
In the Superior Oil Co. case, the court held at page 991 in 
sustaining the judgment of the lower court that: 
"There was competent evidence that the value of 
the farm immediately prior to the crops being 
destroyed was $8,000 and that the value thereof 
immediately following said destruction was 
$7,000." 
In the case of Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Phillips, an 
Arkansas case found at 511 SW 2d 160 (1974), the court held at 
page 164: 
"Since the damages to the homesite were permanent, the 
measure of damages is the difference in the before and 
after value of the property." 
The same measure of damages was applied in the Frankfort Oil v. 
Abrams case cited in Point I above. 
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This same measure of damages should apply in this case. 
It is defendants' position that the 5.88 acres containing 
the well-site and access road were, in effect, taken by plaintiff. 
In support we cite the position of plaintiff's supervisor, Mr. 
(R 305) 
Reese, in saying that plaintiff had "bought the road"/(and, by 
implication, "bought" the well-site), together with the testi-
mony of Mr. Gerber corroborating defendants' appraiser, Marcellus 
Palmer, that the well-site and road never will be able to be 
economically returned to pasture land constitutes a "taking". (R284) 
In Mr. Gerber's words, "The property was gone forever." (R 331) The 
only evidence the court has before it is that 5.88 acres have 
been effectively and permanently taken by the plaintiff and the 
defendants have been damaged the full fair market value of said 
5.88 acres. Plaintiff's contention that the trial court applied 
the wrong measure of damages is without merit. The reasonable 
value of the 5.88 acres as found by the trial court is well 
within the testimony, and, in fact, plaintiff does not dispute 
that fact. 
The rule contended for by the plaintiff that the value 
of one year's crop only should be considered by the court might 
have some merit in a situation where an oil company destroyed 
one year's crop in laying a pipeline or the like, but then 
left the land to be used by the surface owner in subsequent 
years. In this case, plaintiff has not done that. Plaintiff 
-20-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has effectively, as the evidence overwhelmingly shows, perma-
nently deprived defendants of this land. It can never be 
economically used again by the defendants. To limit the 
defendants to the value of one year's crop would be grossly 
unfair. The aforesaid case of Cities Service Gas Co. v. 
Christian holds that the before and after test is proper for 
permanent damage, and the value of a particular crop where the 
damages are only temporary. 
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POINT III, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT IN LOCATING 
THE ROAD WHERE IT DID, PLAINTIFF UNREASONABLY INTER-
FERRED WITH DEFENDANTS1 PRE-EXISTING USE OF THE 
SURFACE, SINCE THERE WERE NON-INTERFERRING AND 
REASONABLE WAYS AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF TO LOCATE 
SAID ROAD WITHOUT SUCH INTERFERENCE, WHEREAS NO 
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS, 
AND THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE DAMAGES AS 
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
It appears that there is considerable authority in this 
country for the proposition that where the surface rights are 
separated from mineral rights, the mineral estate is the domi-
nant estate in the sense that the owner of the mineral estate 
is said to have a right to use so much of the surface as is 
"reasonably necessary" to develop the mineral estate. This 
position seems particularly to have been developed by the courts 
in the oil country of Oklahoma, Texas, and surrounding states. 
In times past, some courts gave the phrase "reasonably necessary" 
a very one-sided interpretation tending to give the oil companies 
almost unlimited control over the surface. This may have seemed 
appropriate at a time when there was much wide open space and 
where surface areas are of minimal value, such as wild range 
land, etc., although, even in the "golden era" of the oil and 
mining barons in which this rule evolved, the courts adopted 
the rule that the surface owner was the dominant estate as 
against the owner of the mineral estate when it came to support 
of the surface, and the courts have held that the owner of the 
mineral estate, mining under a given surface, has a duty to 
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see that the surface does not sink or otherwise become damaged. 
In support of this position, we cite the case of Evans Fuel Co. 
v. Leyda, 236 Pac 1023 (Colo. 1925). 
This frequently one-sided interpretation of the rule of 
reasonable necessity appears to be no longer suited to the 
modern world. As surface areas become cultivated and more popu-
lated, the conflict between surface owners and mineral owners 
has increased, and although oil people like to talk a lot about 
the rule, as they see it, they are nonetheless, it appears, 
acutely embarrassed by the manner in which it has at times been 
applied. It appears that they go about, as in the present case, 
offering surface owners money for "damages" to the surface in 
one breath and claiming in the next that they are doing this 
only for "public relations" and that they have no legal duty 
to do so. It is almost as though they are saying, "We realize 
that this is a bad rule and is grossly unfair and that you should 
not be subjected, Mr. Surface Owner, to having your surface interest 
damaged, but that is the way the law is, and you, therefore, have 
to accept our terms or get nothing at all." If this is the law, 
it is truly a sad state of affairs. So far as we have been able 
to determine, the Supreme Court of Utah has never ruled on this 
matter. We maintain the rule in its one-sided form is out of 
step with current trends and needs. 
The courts of the states of Texas and Oklahoma, in the 
- O Q -
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opinions which are hereinafter cited, in a liberalized appli-
cation of the rule of reasonable necessity have led the way 
toward a more just and fair (and incidentally economically 
more sound) application of the rule by including within the 
meaning of the words "reasonable necessity" the idea of a 
balancing of the rights of the mineral and surface owner, 
which has been called by some the rule of "reasonable alter-
natives" . 
In a number of areas, Utah appears to be already 
committed to the view that the proper approach is a balancing 
of interests. For example, in the area of eminent domain, this 
principle has long been established in Utah. In Section 78-34-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, it provides: 
"In all cases where land is required for public 
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such 
use may survey and locate the same; but it must 
be located in the manner which will be most com-
patible with the greatest public good and the 
least private injury, . . . " (emphasis added) 
That the above language applies to easements as well as 
fee takings was demonstrated in the case of Adamson v. Brockbank 
(1947) 112 Ut 52, 185 Pac 2d 264. In treating the question of 
easements by implication, the court said: 
"The various states have adopted different degrees of 
necessity, but the tendency in recent decisions is 
toward the concept that no more than a reasonable 
necessity is required. Cases in this jurisdiction 
prior to the case of Alcorn v. Reading seem to follow 
this principle. Such principles as "absolute necessity" 
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and "indispensable necessity" have yielded to the rule 
that the necessity requisite to the creation of an 
easement by implication is sufficient if it is a 
"reasonable necessity"• (See 17 Am Jur 943) If this 
test is applied, the rule of necessity in water cases 
is the same as in other cases . . . To the extent that 
the case of Alcorn v. Reading holds there can be no 
easement by implied grant because of the right to 
condemn, it is overruled. The true test is the 
reasonable necessity existing therefor, and we 
reaffirm this principle. If an alternate way per-
mits a grantee to make use of his land at little 
or no cost, the availability of this means might 
be a factor in determining the necessity of the 
easement. (Empasis added) 
See also Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Ut 2d 46, 354 Pac 2d 
852 (1960). 
We also cite the case of Sanford v. University of Utah, 
26 Ut 2d 285, 488 Pac 2d 741 (1971). As to the permissible 
use of surface of realty by adjacent land owners, the Supreme 
Court of Utah there adopted the rule of reasonable use. The 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and stated the 
rule as follows at page 289: 
"The trial court, in effect, in its rulings and 
instructions adopted the rule of "reasonable use": 
"each possessor (of land) is legally privileged to 
make a reasonable use of his land, even though the 
flow of surface waters is altered thereby and 
causes some harm to others, but incurs liability 
when his harmful interference with the flow of 
surface waters is unreasonable." 
In a section of its Brief entitled Background on Applicable 
Law, plaintiff has collected a number of cases which it presents 
as setting forth the applicable law. Many of these cases, we 
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think, demonstrate the one-sided application of the "reason-
able necessity'1 rule. None, we think, involve a fact situation 
which is presented by the instant case concerning"reasonable 
alternatives". All of the cases are prior to 1970, and plain-
tiff totally omits therefrom a consideration of the current 
trend of the cases away from the harsh application of the 
"reasonable necessity" rule. It is this trend since 1970 which 
we feel to be the more enlightened approach. These cases are 
illustrated by the case of Getty Oil v. Jones, 470 SW 2d 618, 
53 ALR 3d 1, (Tx 1971), which is the case the trial court 
followed in reaching its decision in this case. 
As recent enlightened applications of the "reasonable 
necessity" rule in oil and gas cases, we refer the court first 
to the case of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, supra* In that case, 
the court refused to apply the rule that the owner of the 
mineral estate could use the surface in any manner which was 
beneficial to him (which appears to be the rule which is urged 
by the plaintiff). The court in effect held in that case that 
it is now the policy of the law to balance the interests of the 
mineral estate with those of the surface estate, thereby recog-
nizing that society has an interest in both estates and the full 
development thereof, and that in the modern world, it is not fair 
or proper to give either one an undue advantage over the other. 
The court stated at page 6 (53 ALR 3d) that: 
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 . « . where there is an existing use by the surface 
owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, 
and where under the established practices in the 
industry there are alternatives available to the 
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the 
rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require 
the adoption of an alternative by the lessee." 
(Emphasis added) 
In short, the court held that reasonable necessity includes 
consideration of reasonable alternatives. (Inconvenience to 
surface owner alone is not controlling; neither is it a matter 
of balancing harm or inconvenience between surface and mineral.) 
The test seems to be this: There must be a determination that 
under all the circumstances the particular use of the surface 
by the mineral owner is not reasonably necessary. This situ-
ation exists where the surface use is not reasonably necessary 
because there are non-interferring and reasonable ways avail-
able to the mineral owner which would allow the surface owner 
to continue his established use of the surface, and that the 
alternatives available to the surface owner are not reasonable. 
Thus, in the Getty case, the owner of the mineral estate did 
not have an unrestricted right to use the surface in any manner 
which was most advantageous to him, which is the position which 
plaintiff in this case urges upon the court, but, rather, that 
the owner of the mineral interests has a duty to act reasonably 
and fairly as to the surface owner. In the Getty case, the 
court held that there was a reasonable alternative available 
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to the owner of the mineral lease, which, had he employed it, 
would not have destroyed the irrigation procedures of the sur-
face owner, even though to have used the alternative method 
would have necessitated additional expense on the part of the 
oil company. The additional expense which the court indicated 
the oil company should have incurred was upwards of $17,000. 
We also wish to call the attention of the court to the 
case of Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, supra. In that 
case, the defendant oil company was specifically requested 
not to locate the oil well on the area of the plaintiff's prop-
erty where he intended to build a house. Nevertheless, during 
his absence in California, the oil company came in and drilled 
a well in that location. In the lower court, the action was 
tried to a jury and the jury found that the actions of the oil 
company were not reasonable and awarded damages. On appeal 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas sustained the lower court judg-
ment and held that there was evidence to sustain the finding 
of the jury that the action of the defendant oil company was 
not reasonable in locating the oil well in the site where it 
located it. The court approved the Getty case and adopted the 
doctrine of reasonable usage of the surface as stated therein 
and took the rule further in citing an earlier Arkansas case 
at page 163, to-wit, Martin v. Dale, 21 SW 2d 428 (1929), 
which held that the driller of an oil well had a right to 
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ingress and egress, but in exercising that right, "it was his 
duty to do so in the manner least injurious to his grantor..." 
(Emphasis added) 
We further desire to refer the court to the case of 
Humble Oil v. West, 508 SW 2d 81^^ which is a 1974 Texas case. 
In that case, the court again discussed the matter of adjusting 
the relative rights between the surface owner and the mineral 
owner and confirmed its decision in the Getty case, supra, and 
the following portion of that decision (page 818) we feel, is 
particularly revealing: 
"It is manifest that the interests of the parties 
have come into conflict and are not fully com-
patible. Thus, we have again the recurring 
problem of adjusting correlative rights. The 
factual context is unique and there is no 
directly controlling precedent; however, this 
Court has led the way in conciliating conflicts 
between owners of the surface and of the mineral 
rights, and in requiring reasonable accommodations 
between them." (Emphasis added) 
The court in the Humble Oil case at page 818 made the 
following observation in reference to its prior decision in the 
case of Acker v. Guinn, a 1971 case found at 464 SW 2d 348, 
to-wit: 
"In Acker v. Guinn, supra, we affirmed that it 
is not ordinarily contemplated in mineral leases 
or deeds that the utility of the surface will be 
destroyed or substantially impaired by the uses 
made of the surface for the production of 
minerals." 
We submit that it is from this premise that the Getty 
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case and the Humble Oil case proceed, and we feel that it is the 
principle upon which defendants place major reliance in this 
action, namely, that at the time the lease involved in this case 
was executed, the parties certainly did not intend nor contem-
plate that the surface would be substantially impaired or 
destroyed and that when the lessee, contrary to that intention, 
does damage or impair surface uses, then compensation to the 
surface owner is appropriate and should be awarded. 
An excellent survey of the Getty case and subsequent 
developments is found in the South Texas Law Journal, Volume 13, 
at page 269 (1972). We cite from the summarizing paragraph 
thereof as follows: 
"The majority holding in Sun Oil v. Whitaker, when 
(
 viewed in the perspective of its 4-man dissent, 
Acker v. Guinn and Getty v. Jones, will probably 
not stand the test of time. Based on sound public 
policy, the flow of the law seems to necessitate 
a finding in favor of Jones and Whitaker. If a 
man has only one way to make his land productive, 
and another man has several proven ways of making 
his land productive, one of which will exclude 
the other man's use, it seems to the benefit of 
society to let both men use their estates in land 
to the fullest extent." 
The evidence adduced at the trial clearly established 
that the placement of the road by the plaintiff where it did 
was not "reasonably necessary" for the reason that non-
interferring and reasonable ways were available to the plain-
tiff which would have allowed the defendants to continue their 
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pre-existing use of the surface, and that the alternatives 
to the defendants-were unreasonable, in fact, non-existent. 
The evidence (at its worst for defendants) established that 
the plaintiff could have brought in the road from the north 
and thereby not interferred with the irrigation system of the 
defendants at a cost of $9,300* (R 236) The testimony as 
noted in our Statement of Facts established that by taking 
a route somewhat closer to the hay field (that is toward the 
east), the fill would not be required at all, an alternative 
that the plaintiff didn't even consider. The court was justi-
fied in finding from that testimony that the road could be 
brought in from the north at substantially the same cost as 
from the east. The court was justified in finding that there 
would have been no greater expense to the plaintiff as far as 
graveling of either of the county roads was concerned. (R 343) 
Although at the trial, plaintiffs made an attempt to assert 
they were open to negotiations and that there were noble motivations 
for their conduct, however, it is clear from their testimony, 
and the trial court was fully justified-in finding that there 
was no real intent to negotiate on the road location with 
the defendants, and that the sole motivation of the plaintiff 
in putting the road where it did was that it was the shortest 
distance as noted, supra, in our Statement of Facts. Mr. Reese, 
plaintiff's superintendent, so testified at page 310 of the 
*Thus even under this version, such an expenditure is only a 
little over 1/2 that required in Getty, and this would be 
further reduced in determining the extra cost if any by the cost 
of the road in from the east- wb-irh Mni-nix vir»TT^  K^^~ ,,~~~~~~~-~, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
record. It should be pointed out that in the aforesaid Getty 
case, the court held that the means chosen by the oil company 
was unreasonable even though the alternative which the court 
concluded was the reasonable alternative would necessitate 
that the oil company incur an additional expense of $17,000. 
And, therefore, it certainly cannot be said as a matter of law 
that the trial court erred in finding that reasonable alterna-
tives were available to the plaintiff as to the location of 
the road. It should also be noted that although plaintiff's 
complaint was for injunctive relief, that matter was disposed 
of by Judge Sorensen when he granted the restraining order and 
limited the defendants to recovery of damages. (R 46) That 
portion of the lawsuit then that was tried by Judge Bullock 
was a suit for damages by defendants which is legal in nature 
and not equitable. That being the case, the Supreme Court 
should view the evidence and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the Findings 
and Judgment of the trial court. Phillips v. Putnam, 29 Ut 2d^29, 
504 Pac 2d 1376 (1973) . If there is competent evidence to sus-
tain the ruling of the trial court under applicable principles 
of law, the Supreme Court should affirm the trial court. See 
Schlueter v. Summit County, 25 Ut 2d 257, 480 Pac 2d 140 (1971). 
The favored position of the trial court in actually hearing the 
witnesses and observing their demeanor bestows upon the trial 
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court well-established prerogatives, and, of course, the 
decision of the trial court is presumed to be correct. See 
Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 29 Ut 2d 212, 507 Pac 2d 
381 (1973). 
In the light of the foregoing rules of appellate review, 
it seems clear that the evidence adduced at the trial not only 
meets these standards, but is overwhelmingly in favor of the 
trial court. 
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POINT IV. THE SO-CALLED 60-DAY NOTICE PROVISION OF THE 
OIL AND GAS LEASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
We do not consider the provisions of paragraph 13 of 
the lease to be applicable to this case for the following 
reasons: 
1. Plaintiff states at page 30 of its Brief: "Respond-
ent has claimed damages alleging a breach of lessee's obligation 
to act reasonably in locating its facilities and operating the 
same." The Brief then goes on to say that paragraph 13 requires 
a 60-day notice of any claimed breach of contract by plaintiff. 
We submit that this argument overlooks the fact that defendants'-
claim concerning the unreasonableness of plaintiff's conduct 
is not based upon the lease, but rather upon the relative rights 
existing between the surface owner and the mineral owner. (As 
to crop damage, defendant does indeed rely upon the lease, but 
plaintiff does not assert in the Brief any failure on the part 
of defendants to comply with paragraph 13 on the matter of crop damage. 
2. Plaintiff had ample notice of defendants' objections 
to the proposed conduct of plaintiff before plaintiff acted. 
Plaintiff's agents admitted that notice was given numerous times 
by defendants of their objections, and still plaintiff persisted 
in its course of conduct. It is clear that it intended to pro-
ceed as it did in spite of defendants' protests, and defendants 
are not required in any event to do a useless act. 
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3. Defendants1 objections as contained in files of this 
action (which preceded its Counterclaim by more than 60 days) 
would satisfy the requirements of paragraph 13, even if it 
were applicable. See, for example, defendants1 Motion to For-
feit Bond served on plaintiff's counsel on January 24, 1974, 
(R 22) which was thus served many months prior to defendants1 
Counterclaim, which was served in December of 1974. (R 53-56) 
4. This defense of 60-days notice would be an affirmative 
defense in any event and was not properly raised by plaintiff in 
its Reply. 
The testimony of the witnesses at the trial clearly shows 
that the damage caused by the roadway and the well-site is perma-
nent because of the compaction of the road and the destruction 
of the ground under the well-site fill, and there would appear 
to be no way for plaintiff to cure the damage which it has done 
at this stage within 60 days or any other time. 
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POINT V, THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT RULE TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE EVEN THOUGH THE PHRASE 
"POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE" WAS USED IN PARAGRAPH 3 
OF THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
A fair reading of the trial court's Memorandum Decision 
(R 64) and of the Findings of Fact (R 66-71) demonstrate that 
the trial court understood and applied the rule of the Getty 
case, even though the Court in paragraph 3 of the said Memo-
randum Decision used the phrase "possible alternative". In 
the Findings of Fact, the Court used the phrase "reasonable 
alternatives" (see paragraph 6 thereof) and it is clear that 
the trial court was at all times concerned with reasonableness 
and intended that concept throughout as opposed to mere possi-
bilities. We view this objection as being trivial as well as 
erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the decision of the lower court is in accord with the facts 
and the law and should accordingly be affirmed in all particulars. 
Respectfully submitted: 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Robert C. Cummings 
MADSEN & CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants 
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